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ABSTRACT

In the past, satellites were designed without adequately discussing
issues with the users. This is an extremely poor business practice; if
the acquisition community were a competitive business, that attitude
would be considered a precursor to failure. A change in attitude comparable to the customer awareness inherent in a competitive environment
would have several positive benefits. First, product design would be
tailored to the customer's real needs. Second, this awareness would
foster searching out the most cost-effective (in terms of time, money,
technology, etc.) methods of providing equipment.
INTRODUCTION

Warfighting commands need sustainable and survivable lines of
communications. This statement should come as no surprise to anyone;
communications are vital to a coordinated warfighting effort, and serve
to insure maximum utilization of resources. This principle has been
recorded as early as Sun Tzu, who wrote "And to control many is the same
as to control few. This is a matter of formations and signals." Many
battles throughout history have been lost for lack of a crucial piece of
information being either relayed or received in a timely manner.
Operational communications requirements are ultimately translated into
such vehicles as command networks or conference bridges, secure voice or
data systems, data relay systems, or any of many other possible methods
of achieving transference of needed information. Some of these vehicles
will require partial or total reliance on satellite communications to
achieve their long-haul links.
The usual way for the user to communicate this desire for satellite
communications support is to submit a request for inclusion in the User
Requirements Data Base. Periodically, these new submissions are
reviewed for validation. If validated, additional processing is
required; its nature is dependent on the satellite system for which the
request was approved. When these requirements are presented to the
acquisition community, they come in the form of compiled data. The
not get
identity of the users and urgency of their needs do
transferred with the data.
One might ask why this would be of any importance to the acquisition
community; after all, satellites are designed to fulfill specifications
that come directly from that compiled data. This is true; however, that

compiled data does not relay information about application and the cost
to the user if that capability is not available. The sense of urgency
that such information imparts is critical to an attitude analogous to
"competitive edge" in a commercial concern. The statement "We need a
satellite that will pass X megabits per s second" is hardly inspiring, and
would motivate very few people to work faster, harder, or smarter. If
you take the same requirements and also define them as "We need a
satellite that will enable CINCSAC to place their bombers optimally in
case of an attack on CONUS, and will enable CINCSPACE to get real-time
missile information, etc.", people will see a need and gain a time
awareness for them - assuming they have had certain experiences or have
been in the military for a sufficient length of time.
A lack of common core of communications between the operational and
acquisition communities lies at the heart of the problem.
Traditionally, there has been little one-on-one interaction between
these two communities. This has been compounded by the acquisition
community being somewhat insular in nature. PCS moves from one product
division to another give people little exposure to the operational
military. Program offices have few people who have had direct exposure
to warfighting needs; many of these people hold AFSCs that are not
traditionally tied to Systems Command, and consequently are not
guaranteed to stay within the command for more than one tour.
Additionally, a significant number of program office personnel are on
their first assignment, and carry with them no sense of how the military
really functions. Cumulatively, this results in an acquisition
community that at the working level has little feel for how the
operational commands accomplish their missions.
A BUSINESS ANALYSIS

Before we can analyze whether methods employed by the acquisition
community can be improved upon, let us review what the customer really
wants. The ultimate desire is for communications service - to enable
information to be relayed to or received from someone else. There are
three corollary desires in obtaining that service:
The user desires 100% requirements satisfaction
The user desires this satisfaction to be met in
conjunction with his real-time needs
The user desires usable end-to-end service
Operational commanders have to maintain lines of communications
appropriate to both their peacetime and wartime roles and
responsibilities. Additionally, operational commanders are as keenly
aware of budget constraints as the acquisition community; their stated
requirements are not frivolously submitted. Also, consider that
networks do not consist of space on a satellite alone; these networks
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represent considerable capital outlay to the operational commander's
budget in terms of commercial ground circuits, terminal equipment, user
consoles, etc. If that space on a satellite is not available, the
entire network may be rendered useless.
This takes us to the issue of real-time satisfaction. Even though the
satellite communications requirement is not met, the operational
requirement does not go away. The command can either reconfigure the
network to incorporate lower capabilities which can be satisfied, or
they can wait to be satisfied at some point in the future.
The last desire is a issue of system design and timeline coordination.
A satellite cannot stand alone; nor can a ground terminal. It is of no
use to the operational commander for one component of the communications
system to be in place and functional while other components are delayed
in delivery.
Now, if one were to establish a corporation that intended to compete for
this customer ! s business, what measures would they be likely to take?
They would first make it their business to know this customer - what he
wanted, how he intended to use it, what cost if the product desired were
not available. They would create an atmosphere where continuous dialog
between themselves and the customer could flow, where impacts and
tradeoffs could be discussed to the benefit of both parties. For
example, a technology might surface that would give a slight gain in
performance, at the cost to the customer of a one-year delay. The gain
in performance might be worth it to most of the customers; but if not,
and the company were to proceed anyway, all parties would lose. The
customers would lose time and satisfaction; the company would lose money
and effort better applied to other things. This company would produce a
product which would be usable as a system; if they did not produce it
solely in-house, the subcontractor portion would be closely coordinated
and scheduled to come available on time. The system f s life-cycle
requirements would also be factored in as a consideration in the overall
product package.
Now if you compare this to contemporary acquisition practice, there are
a few obvious differences. For the most part, our knowledge of the
operational commanders' requirements relies on a huge data base and
published analyses of requirements. These items, useful as they are,
don f t convey the "big picture" as regards their use. They also don't
impart a sense of under what conditions a delay in service would be
deemed acceptable. Also, we don't tend to build systems under the aegis
of one organization. Since we don't build as one system, there is a
problem with life-cycle costs not being considered as a system. If
funding is cut in one area, it can be detrimental to the whole system,
regardless of its stage in the acquisition process.
The customer, of course, is going to choose the provider who can supply
the service desired with minimum operational impact and maximum economy
of effort. The customer is also likely to be more comfortable with the
provider who is familiar with his needs and receptive to his inputs.
These are qualities the acquisition community finds desirable when
dealing with contractors. It should come as no surprise that the
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operational commands would find the qualities of an informed and
system-oriented provider to be equally desirable in their acquisition
community. In a market-driven environment, our approach would be doomed
to failure, simply because someone else eventually will come on the
scene who is committed to doing it better.
THE "COMPETITIVE EDGE 11

How do we get that "competitive edge", to do our best efforts with a
sensitivity to our customers 1 needs? This is fairly straightforward
with commercial concerns - the law of the marketplace prevails. You
lose market share, you lose revenue; loss of revenue can mean loss of
profits, or it can translate into less money to invest back into the
capabilities of the company. Essentially, the competitive edge is
external ly imposed.
We, on the other hand, do not have any competition to impose this
heightened sense of awareness upon us. Therefore, we must commit to
engender it within ourselves, the acquisition community. Though this is
by no means an exhaustive list, there are three things we can do to
improve our awareness:
Employ Total Quality Management techniques
Engage in direct interaction with relevant
components in the 'user communities
-

Disseminate operational "sense of urgency"
to acquisition personnel

Total Quality Management (TQM) is being strongly advocated in the
acquisition community. As one reviews Dr. Deming's Fourteen Points, the
underlying themes of working together as a cohesive unit and striving
always for top performance rise to the surface. As TQM awareness
improves, one can expect our "competitive" performance to improve. TQM
alone is not the answer; we also need to be aware of what we are trying
to accomplish.
Interaction with the users should be an ongoing practice. This could
prove to be an invaluable sanity check throughout the acquisition
process. It is true that some program offices have people on staff with
operational experience; however, there are many aspects to national
defense. These staff personnel may not have appropriate experience,
they may not be current, or they may not possess the "big picture". On
the other hand, the operational commander's staff does. The best places
to start are a command's Plans/Programs and Communications divisions.
There are a number of methods which could be employed to indoctrinate
acquisition personnel on the impact of unavailable communications. I
believe that there is none better than direct observance (or a

reasonable facsimile thereof). For example, as observers in a major
exercise, acquisition personnel could observe firsthand the linear
relationship between loss of communications and erosion of command and
control. From there, it is simple to see the impact of not having the
communications capability at all.
BENEFITS

Before we would commit ourselves to a course of maintaining open
discussions with the users and soliciting their inputs on design
considerations, we should first establish what there is to be gained.
Our first gain would be design and schedule attuned to the operational
commander's real needs. Of course, since there are a multitude of
users, not all needs could be satisfied for all users. In some
instances, the technology is not yet sufficient to their needs. But
overall, the user f s needs and timelines would drive design and schedule,
rather than technological fine-tuning.
Technological fine-tuning leads us to the second gain, which is cost
effectiveness, in both time and money. State-of-the-art advances have
to be evaluated as a tradeoff against needs; putting it another way, is
what you gain technologically sufficient to offset what you lose in
terms of timely service? If a majority of your users need the service
now and the current technology is sufficient, then "improving" the
design could be detrimental to the national defense. Without some sort
of sanity check, there is also the real possibility of "improving" a
program so often that it doesn f t gets built. Also, as you go further
out in time, there are two fiscal dangers which must be considered. The
longer ,a program drags out in acquisition, the more it costs to build.
And, in these fiscally conservative times, there is the ever-present
danger of budget cuts or cancellation.
The best way to evaluate the
impacts of a proposed design change is to talk to the people who need
the service, and consider their inputs with the merit they
deserve.
CONCLUSION

The operational and acquisition communities have been separated in the
past by the lack of a common core of communications and a large
collection of documents. As these communities come to work together in
acquiring equipment designed to meet required capabilities, we will come
closer to our common goal - defense of the United States and her allies.
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